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Social Distance and Reciprocity
Abstract
______________________________________________________________________________
Contrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game theory, trust and reciprocity are commonly
reported in simple games. We conduct a one-shot investment game to examine how social
distance affects behavior in two-person exchanges. Two aspects of social distance are examined:
ex post revelation of complete information on the second player’s choice set and ex post
revelation of information regarding the second player’s identity. The results indicate that
reciprocity is not affected by knowledge of the choice set, but depends critically on the possible
revelation of the decision maker’s identity. That is, the possibility that the second player’s
identity (picture) is revealed to his/her counterpart has a profound effect on the degree of
reciprocity extended.
______________________________________________________________________________
Key Words: identity, reciprocity, and trust

Social Distance and Reciprocity

I. Introduction
Many game-theoretic models presume that individual behavior is dictated by selfregarding preferences and, in certain controlled settings, the self-regarding model can predict
quite well (e.g., refer to Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cox and Deck, 2005). At the same time,
people are predisposed to act cooperatively. Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) provide
empirical support for the argument that reciprocity and trust are behavioral primitives. They
investigate behavior in a one-shot investment game in which reciprocity is paramount,
characterized as follows. Two players are anonymously paired and both are endowed with cash.
The first player is allowed to send any portion of his/her endowment to the second player, with
the amount sent being increased by a multiplier. The second player then has the option of
returning any portion of the amount received. The sub-game perfect equilibrium is for the first
player to send nothing. Experimental findings, however, are not consistent with this prediction:
instead positive amounts are usually sent and returned.
The current study investigates the effect of social distance on reciprocity in the one-shot
investment game. Charness and Gneezy (2003, 1) refer to social distance as “the emotional
proximity induced by a situation.” In terms of the investment game, social distance is reduced if
information about the second player is revealed to the first player, even if the information is
revealed ex post (i.e., after decisions have been made and the game has been completed). Simply
put, the second player may worry about what the first player thinks (e.g., whether the first player
thinks poorly of the second player). Experimental evidence suggests that such concerns can

influence behavior in controlled settings (e.g., Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2004; Dana, Weber, and
Kuang, 2004).1
We suggest that altering the information available to players affects the social distance
between them. We investigate social distance in the investment game and focus on whether two
aspects of information revelation are important: information on the second player’s choice set
and information concerning the second player’s identity. To isolate the effects of uncertainty
concerning actions and identity, we modify the standard game. First, we introduce uncertainty as
to the money available to the second player. In the standard investment game, the second
player’s choices are known.2 We manipulate whether the first player is informed (at the
conclusion of the experiment) of the multiplier used to determine the money available to the
second player. Second, we introduce the possibility that the second player’s identity is revealed.
We manipulate whether a die is rolled to determine if the second player’s picture is sent to the
first player at the conclusion of the experiment. These two aspects of the investment game
reduce social distance, but in distinct ways. Information regarding the multiplier provides
information about the second player’s choice set (actions), whereas the potential picture provides
personal information about the second player (identity). In either case, a second player may
respond more generously because ex post revelation of information reduces social distance.
In the initial treatment the first player does not know the multiplier that is applied to the
money sent to the second player. Rather the first player is informed that the multiplier is either
three or six, each with an equal chance of occurrence. Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth and
1

In related research, Charness and Dufwenberg (2004) suggest that the second player’s underlying concerns reflect
guilt aversion. According to Charness and Dufwenberg (2004, 6), a person with guilt aversion is motivated by
“beliefs about others’ beliefs.” In our experiment, shame (which is externally generated) may drive behavior rather
than guilt (which is internally generated). Our design does not allow us to differentiate these sentiments.
2
The first player is aware of the money available to the second player (i.e., the amount sent times the multiplier) and
that any portion can be returned.
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Murnighan (1982) find that the availability of information can have a strong effect on choices,
even if the availability of information does not change the theoretical predictions. When subjects
receive information about others’ monetary payoffs, decisions move in the direction of equal
expected payoffs. In our first treatment, we examine the extent to which each player’s behavior
is affected by the fact that the second player’s decision is not transparent. We compare the
decisions of both players to those of players in a second treatment in which the multiplier is
revealed ex post to the first player. We find that this reduction of social distance has no impact
on the behavior of participants in our experiment.
Next we introduce the possibility that the first player will receive a picture of the second
player after all decisions are made. Burnham (2003) reports that anonymity has a significant
effect on behavior in dictator games (see also Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994;
Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; 1999; Bohnet and Frey, 1999).3 As in our experiment,
photographs are used to reduce social distance.4 We find that the first player’s behavior is not
affected by reducing social distance; however, the second player displays greater reciprocity
when identification to his/her counterpart is possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The research method, including the
experimental design and procedures, are reviewed in the following section. Section III presents
the results and Section IV summarizes our study and provides direction for future research.

3

Bolton and Zwick (1995) and Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998) question whether anonymity explains behavior in
dictator games. Note that their concern is with the experimenter’s observation of subject behavior, rather than
anonymity between subjects. As we discuss subsequently, subjects’ decisions are anonymous in our experiment.
4
The use of photographs, as opposed to allowing players to directly observe one another (e.g., Bohnet and Frey,
1999), eliminates non-verbal cues.

3

II. Research Method
Experimental Overview and Design
The experiment consists of a one-shot investment game, similar to that conducted by
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). In the game, one half of the subjects are located in room A
and the other half in room B. Subjects from each room are randomly paired and each subject is
endowed with $10. Subjects in room A decide how much of the initial endowment to send to a
paired counterpart in room B. The amount sent is increased by a multiplier. We vary the
multiplier among subjects in room B: either three or six with each having an equal chance of
occurrence. Subjects in room B use the multiplier to determine the amount of funds available
and then decide how much to return to room A.
Our design includes three experimental treatments. In the BASE treatment, subjects in
room A do not learn the multiplier of their paired counterpart. In the PAYOFF treatment,
subjects in room A are informed of the multiplier, but not until the conclusion of the experiment.
Lastly, in the IDENTITY treatment, subjects in room A do not learn the multiplier, but they may
receive a picture of their paired counterpart at the conclusion of the experiment.

Subjects
Participants include undergraduate and graduate students, with the majority (68 percent)
pursuing a program of study in business. A total of 244 students (or 122 pairs) participated, with
the experimental sessions consisting of four to 16 students (2 to 8 pairs).5 Students are recruited

5

In addition, student monitors participate in the experimental sessions, assisting in conducting the sessions. The
monitors are not included in the number of subjects reported in the text of the paper.
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at two state universities in the same city.6 Each session lasted about 45 minutes, and students
earned on average $25.93 for their participation.
The BASE treatment includes 88 subjects, the PAYOFF treatment 90 subjects, and the
IDENTITY treatment 66 subjects. The average age is 23.17 years, 23.94 years, and 24.80 years,
for the three treatments, respectively, with a Kruskal-Wallis test indicating no significant
difference between treatments (χ2 = 2.62, p = 0.270). The number of males/females is 53/35,
46/44, and 34/32 for the three treatments, respectively, with a chi-square test indicating no
significant differences across the treatments (χ2 = 1.82, p = 0.403).7

Experimental Procedures
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of two rooms, with one half in each room. An
experimenter distributes instructions and reads them aloud (reproduced in the Appendix).
Though subjects are located in different rooms, the instructions are identical in the two rooms.
Next, subjects draw envelopes from a bag.8 The envelopes include a unique subject code
number.9 For subjects in room A, the envelopes also include a decision form, which is used to
transmit information between the two rooms – the amount sent and returned. For subjects in
room B, the envelopes include a computation form, which indicates the subject’s multiplier and

6

All students participating in a particular session are from the same university. Of the 244 students taking part, 152
are from one university and 92 are from another. The data are not suggestive of any difference in students’ behavior
between the two universities.
7
We also partition subjects by whether they complete the experiment in room A or room B. For subjects in room A,
the three treatments do not differ in terms of age (χ2 = 2.18, p = 0.335) or the number of males/females (χ2 = 2.69, p
= 0.260). Likewise, for subjects in room B, we do not find significant differences between treatments for age (χ2 =
0.60, p = 0.742) or the number of males/females (χ2 = 6.19, p = 0.186).
8
One of the envelopes is marked monitor. The monitor is not paired with another participant, but rather verifies that
the instructions are followed. The monitor is paid the average earnings of all the other participants in the session.
9
Code numbers are recorded on the outside of each envelope as well as on an index card included in the envelopes.
Subjects retain the index cards throughout the experiment and the envelopes are passed along to different people. At
the end of the experiment, each envelope is returned to the subject who originally drew the envelope. The index
cards enable the monitor to return each envelope to the correct person.
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is used to compute the amount of money available. Each multiplier is equally likely and over the
course of the entire experiment (all sessions), one half of the computation forms available for
draw indicate a multiplier of three and the other half six.
At the outset of the experiment, subjects in room A decide how much of the initial
endowment to send to room B. They can send any amount from $0 to $10 in $1 increments.
Subjects in room A complete the decision form and return it to the original envelope. The
envelopes are collected, taken to room B, and randomly distributed. Subjects in room B multiply
the amount received by either three or six based on their computation form.10 Subjects in room
B then decide how much to send back to room A. The amount sent back can range from $0 to
three or six times the amount received. Subjects in room B complete the computation form and
then record the amount returned to room A on the decision form.
In the BASE treatment, the computation and decision forms are put back in the original
envelopes: that is, the computation forms are placed in the room B envelopes and the decision
forms are placed in the room A envelopes. The envelopes are collected and taken to a recorder,
who does not have any knowledge of the experiment. Using the two forms, the recorder
determines subjects’ payments and puts cash in the original envelopes. The recorder also puts
the forms back in the original envelopes, which are subsequently returned to subjects in rooms A
and B. As such, subjects in room A never see the computation form and, in turn, do not know
the multiplier or the amount of funds available to subjects in room B.11

10

We do not include the initial endowment given to subjects in room B in computing the total funds available,
which is the convention followed in the standard investment game. Informal discussions indicate that subjects in
room B view the initial endowment as theirs to keep and that the luck of the draw resulted in them being assigned to
room B.
11
If the amount returned is large relative to the amount sent, subjects in room A may be able to infer that the
multiplier of their paired counterpart is six. Generally, though, subjects in room A will not be able to infer the
multiplier.
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The PAYOFF treatment differs from the BASE treatment as follows. Subjects in room B
put the decision and computation forms in the same envelope – the one originally received from
room A. The recorder does not change the placement of the two forms (i.e., the two forms are
left in the envelopes returned to room A). In this case, subjects in room A can examine the
computation form and, thus, learn the multiplier of their paired counterpart.
The IDENTITY treatment differs from the BASE treatment as follows. At the beginning
of the session, the experimenter takes a picture of each subject in room B using an instant,
Polaroid camera and places the pictures in front of each subject. After subjects in room B decide
how much to return to room A – and after they put the computation and decision forms back in
the original envelopes – a six-sided die is rolled.12 If an odd number is rolled, the subject’s
picture is placed in the envelope returned to the paired counterpart in room A. If an even number
is rolled, the subject’s picture remains in the room. Accordingly, there is a 50 percent chance
that a subject’s picture will be sent from room B to room A, and all subjects are aware of this
possibility.13
In all treatments, after the envelopes are returned to subjects in rooms A and B, a postexperiment questionnaire is administered. Subjects receive $5 for completing the
questionnaire.14 The questionnaire is used to collect demographic information and other
information that may provide insight into subjects’ decisions.15 Upon completion of the
questionnaire, subjects are free to leave.

12

The die is rolled for each subject in room B.
If a subject’s picture is sent to room A, only his/her paired counterpart sees the picture, which is not publicly
displayed.
14
The $5 is the minimum amount that a subject can earn for participating in the experiment. The experimental
instructions indicate that all subjects will receive $5 for completing a questionnaire at the end of the session.
15
We examine whether differences arise between subjects in the three treatments on religious beliefs (1=not
religious at all and 11=very religious), political attitudes (1=very liberal and 11=very conservative), and economic
13
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III. Results
First we provide descriptive data for each experimental treatment. We examine the
amount sent by subjects in room A and the amount returned by subjects in room B. The amount
sent represents the trust exhibited by subjects in room A. For the amount returned, we normalize
by the amount available to subjects in room B (i.e., the multiplier times the amount received).
The ratio represents the extent to which subjects in room B exhibit reciprocity. We test whether
the reciprocity ratio differs between subjects with a multiplier of three and those with a
multiplier of six.16 Subsequently, we formally test for differences in trust and reciprocity
between the three treatments.

BASE Treatment
Panels A and B of Figure 1 depict the distribution of trust and reciprocity displayed by
subjects in rooms A and B, respectively. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. For
subjects in room A, the majority (33 of 44 subjects) sends at least one-half of the initial
endowment to room B. The mean and median are in excess of $6 and the mode is $10 (the entire
endowment). Hence, subjects in room A are willing to send a considerable portion of their initial
endowment to room B.
For subjects in room B, the reciprocity ratio is less than 50 percent most of the time (35
of 40 instances), which indicates that subjects in room B keep more than they return. The
reciprocity ratio is greater than 50 percent only once. As a rule of thumb, subjects in room B
situation (1=poor and 11=wealthy). We perform Kruskal-Wallis tests and in no case are differences significant at
conventional levels. We repeat the analysis separately for subjects who complete the experiment in room A and in
room B and find that inferences are unaffected.
16
We also examine the raw (non-normalized) amount returned. Inferences are not affected, except where noted.
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rarely return more than they keep. Panel B of Table 1 indicates that the median (and mode)
reciprocity ratio is 0.33 for subjects with a multiplier of three and 0.17 for subjects with a
multiplier of six. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test indicates that the ratio does not differ between
subjects with multipliers of three and six at the 5 percent level (z = −1.76, p = 0.083).17
Next, we examine the ratio of the amount returned normalized by the amount sent,
referred to as the return on trust. We find that the return on trust is 1.00 or less 26 of 40 times.
The amount returned to subjects in room A very often is no more than the amount sent. Coupled
with the previous findings (i.e., using the reciprocity ratio), the data suggest that subjects in room
B keep more than their fair share of the surplus created due to amounts being sent from room A.

PAYOFF Treatment
The distribution of trust and reciprocity is depicted in Panels A and B, respectively, of
Figure 2 and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. For subjects in room A, the amount sent
is similar to that in the BASE treatment. Thirty-one of 45 subjects send at least one-half of the
initial endowment. The mean and median are $6 and the mode is $10. As before, subjects in
room A are willing to send a substantial portion of their initial endowment to room B.
For subjects in room B, the reciprocity ratio is less than 50 percent a majority of the time
(33 of 42 times) and it is more than 50 percent only four times. Once again, subjects in room B
seldom return more than they keep. The mean and median are not more than 0.33, partitioning
subjects by the multiplier of three or six. Strikingly, the mode is zero. For subjects with a
multiplier of three, seven of 22 return nothing. For those with a multiplier of six, the numbers

17

Throughout the paper, inferences are unaffected regardless of whether we perform a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test or a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. In fact, parametric t-tests also result in similar inferences.
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are similar: seven of 20 return nothing. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test indicates that the
reciprocity ratio is unaffected by the multiplier at any conventional level (z = −0.81, p = 0.416).
Looking at return on trust, we find that it is 1.00 or less 24 of 42 times. All in all, the findings
for the PAYOFF treatment appear similar to the findings for the BASE treatment. Although ex
post revelation of information about the multiplier reduces social distance by providing detail on
the second player’s choice set (actions), the second player’s behavior is not responsive. Our
results suggest that revelation of the multiplier induces little guilt or shame in second players.

IDENTITY Treatment
Panels A and B of Figure 3 depict the distribution of trust and reciprocity for subjects in
rooms A and B, respectively. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. For subjects in
room A, the data are very similar to those presented earlier. Twenty-four of 33 send at least onehalf of the initial endowment to room B. The mean and median are $6.48 and $6.00,
respectively, and the mode is $10. Again, subjects in room A send a sizable portion of the initial
endowment to room B.
For subjects in room B, the reciprocity ratios appear to be greater than the ratios in the
other two treatments. The mean and median ratios are 0.50 or near this value for most groupings
(i.e., partitioning subjects by the multiplier or combining them). Moreover, the mode is at least
0.50 for each grouping. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test indicates that the multiplier does not
affect subjects’ reciprocity ratio at any conventional level (z = −0.84, p = 0.423).18 These data
suggest that subjects in room B often split the amount available to them evenly or nearly evenly.
18

Looking at the raw amount returned, we find that subjects with a multiplier of six return more than those with a
multiplier of three (z = -2.03, p = 0.043). This finding is consistent with greater reciprocity arising in the
IDENTITY treatment. As reciprocity increases, subjects with a multiplier of six return more because they have
more available.
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The possibility of having a picture sent to the paired counterpart appears to result in more
reciprocity by subjects in room B. We also examine return on trust and find that it is 1.00 or
more 30 of 33 times. Indeed, return on trust exceeds 1.00 25 of 33 times. Subjects in room A
benefit by introducing the possibility that the identity (picture) of the paired subject in room B
will be revealed. In this treatment, the chance that a picture is sent reduces social distance
because personal information about the second player may be provided. Our results are
consistent with the argument that second players who are averse to feelings of guilt or shame
resulting from the revelation of identity respond more generously.

Comparisons across Treatments
To formally test for differences between the three experimental treatments, we perform
Kruskal-Wallis tests. To assess differences in trust, we use the amount sent by subjects in room
A as the dependent measure. To assess differences in reciprocity, we use the reciprocity ratio
and the return on trust as the dependent measures. For the reciprocity ratio, we perform the tests
collapsing subjects with different multipliers into one group and for each multiplier group
separately. The results are summarized below.19
For the amount sent by subjects in room A, we do not find any significant difference
between the three treatments (χ2 = 0.57, p = 0754). For the reciprocity ratio, the results indicate
that the experimental treatment affects the decisions of subjects in room B at p < 0.001 (χ2 =
18.16). Using the Steel-Dwass-Critchlow-Fligner procedure for distribution-free multiple
comparisons, we find that the reciprocity ratio for the IDENTITY treatment differs from that of

19

We also investigate whether behavior is affected by the number of subjects who take part in a session. Extensive
analysis does not provide any evidence that our findings are affected by the number of subjects per session.
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the other two treatments at p < 0.001 (refer to Hollander and Wolfe, 1999, 240-248). Subjects in
room B reciprocate to a greater extent in the IDENTITY treatment than in the BASE or
PAYOFF treatments. We repeat the analysis for subjects with a multiplier of three and for those
with a multiplier of six and find that inferences are unaffected. Lastly, for return on trust, we
find that differences arise among the three treatments, as may be expected (χ2 = 16.88, p <
0.001). Using the Steel-Dwass-Critchlow-Fligner procedure, we document that the IDENTITY
treatment differs from the other two treatments at p < 0.005. Return on trust is greater when
subjects in room B may have to send a picture of themselves to their paired counterpart in room
A.

IV. Summary and Conclusions
The paper reports a series of one-shot investment games designed to examine the effect
of social distance on trust and reciprocity. We vary two aspects of social distance across
experimental treatments: whether the second player’s choice set is disclosed to the first player
and whether the second player’s picture is potentially sent to the first player, with both aspects
being revealed at the end of the experiment (i.e., after all decisions have been made). The ex
post information about the second player (i.e., revelation of the multiplier to determine payoffs
or potential revelation of identity) reduce social distance. In both cases, a second player who is
averse to feelings of guilt or shame may respond more generously as social distance is reduced.
We find the following. The first player sends a considerable portion of his/her initial
endowment to the second player, with the amount sent being invariant to the experimental
treatment. The second player often returns a positive amount, but the magnitude is affected by
social distance. In the BASE and PAYOFF treatments, the second player typically returns no
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more than the amount received from the first player. In other words, any surplus arising from the
amount sent to the second player is generally kept by the second player. In the IDENTITY
treatment, on the other hand, the second player displays greater reciprocity and normally returns
more than was received. Importantly, the second player’s behavior is not affected by the ex post
revelation of the player’s choice set, but it is affected by potential ex post revelation of the
player’s identity.
Others have shown that revealing players’ identity before decisions are made affects
behavior (e.g., Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003). Our study demonstrates that such
effects arise even when identity is revealed after decisions are made. Further, we demonstrate
that the effect arises when there is merely a possibility that the second player’s identity will be
revealed. We encourage future researchers to investigate other factors that may generate guilt
aversion or shame and encourage reciprocity – especially in a one-shot investment game.
Charness and Gneezy (2003) suggest that knowledge of a paired counterpart’s surname can
affect behavior. Knowledge of other personal features (e.g., sex, age, nationality, and race) also
may influence behavior. Factors that cause players to identify with one another clearly may be
important in explaining pro-social behavior (e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997). In addition,
non-verbal cues, such as facial expressions or physical attractiveness may impact behavior (e.g.,
Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, and Wilson, 2001; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004). Finally, another
intriguing aspect is whether the physical location of two players affects behavior. Charness,
Haruvy, and Sonsino (2003) manipulate whether subjects are located in the same room versus in
different countries (participating via the Internet). Their findings suggest that physical location
may not matter as long as subjects are paired with another completing the experiment at the same

13

time (i.e., contemporaneous participation). Further research is needed to clarify factors that
affect behavior (trust and reciprocity) and to understand how such factors impact behavior.

14

Appendix
1. Instructions for the BASE Treatment
General Instructions
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making experiment. In the experiment, you
will be paired with another participant located in another room. You will not be told the identity
of the other participant at any time during or after the experiment. It is very important that you
not talk or communicate with others throughout the experiment.
One half of the participants are completing the experiment in Room A and the other half in
Room B. Each participant in Room A will be randomly paired with someone in Room B. Each
participant in Room A and Room B is given $10. Participants in Room A have the opportunity
to send any portion of their $10 to a randomly assigned participant in Room B. Participants in
Room A can send any dollar amount – $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, or $10.
Each dollar sent to Room B is increased either three times or six times. Only participants in
Room B know whether the amount received is increased three or six times. The likelihood that
the amount increases three times is 50 percent and the likelihood that it increases six times is 50
percent. Over the entirety of the experiment (i.e., over many sessions), the amount sent is
multiplied by three one-half of the time and by six the other half. Participants in Room B decide
how much money to send back to Room A and how much money to keep. Participants in Room
B can send back any dollar amount – ranging from $0 to three- or six-times the amount received
from Room A.
The remainder of the instructions explains exactly how the experiment is conducted. The
experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters, will know the personal
decisions of participants in Room A or Room B.
Specific Instructions
Participants in each room will draw envelopes from a bag. The envelopes will include a code
number, which you must keep with you. One of the envelopes will be marked ‘Monitor.’ The
Monitor will not be paired with another participant, but rather will verify that the instructions are
followed and assist in conducting the experiment. The Monitor’s envelope will indicate how
s/he is paid at the conclusion of the experiment.
In addition to a code number, the envelopes include different information for participants in
Room A and Room B. For those in Room A, the envelope contains a decision form, which
includes the participant’s code number. The decision form requires participants in Room A to
indicate the amount to send to a randomly paired participant in Room B – this can be any dollar
amount from $0 to $10. For participants in Room B, the envelopes include a computation form,
which includes the participant’s code number, and states whether the amount received increases
three times or six times. Remember, there is a 50 percent chance that the amount received
increases three times and a 50 percent chance that it increases six times.
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Participants in Room A complete the decision form and return it to the original envelope.
The monitor collects the envelopes, which are then randomly distributed to participants in Room
B. Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six. Next,
participants in Room B determine how much to send back to the randomly-paired participant in
Room A – the amount sent back can range from $0 to three or six times the amount received.
As mentioned earlier, participants in both rooms receive a form. Each form must be
completely filled out. The decision form received by participants in Room A is shown below.
The first line is filled in. Participants in Room A fill in the second line. Participants in Room B
fill in the third and fourth lines.
Decision Form – Room A
(1) Code Number - Room A:
__________
(2) Amount Sent to Room B:
__________
(3) Code Number - Room B:
__________
(4) Amount Returned to Room A: __________
The computation form received by participants in Room B is shown below. The form is used
to determine the amount of money available to participants in Room B. The first line is filled in.
The second line also is filled in and indicates whether the amount received increases three times
or six times. Participants in Room B fill in the third, fourth, and fifth lines.
Computation Form – Room B
(1) Code Number - Room B:
__________
(2) Increase in Amount Received: __________
(3) Amount Received:
__________
(4) Amount Available [(2) x (3)]: __________
(5) Amount Kept:
__________
Ultimately, the decision form is returned to participants in Room A and is used to determine
their payoffs. The computation form is only used to determine payoffs for participants in Room
B. The form is returned to participants in Room B and is never seen by participants in Room A.
Upon completion in Room B, the forms are returned to the original envelopes, collected, and
taken to a Recorder. The Recorder, who does not have any knowledge of the participants or the
purpose of the experiment, makes a record of participants’ decisions and calculates the payoffs.
Payments for participation are placed in an envelope and returned to participants by the Monitor.
The payments are calculated as follows.
Room A = $10 – amount sent + amount returned
Room B = $10 + (multiplier * amount received) – amount returned
Participants in Room A each receive an envelope that contains their payment along with the
returned decision form – now completely filled out. Participants in Room B each receive an
envelope that contains their payment along with their computation form.
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In addition to the procedures described above, all participants are paid $5 for completing a
post-experiment questionnaire. The amount you receive in the envelope includes the $5 for the
questionnaire.
Summary of Procedures
1. Participants in each room randomly draw an envelope.
2. In Room A, the envelopes contain a code number and a decision form.
3. In Room B, the envelopes contain a code number and a computation form. The computation
form indicates whether the amount received increases three times or six times.
4. Participants in Room A determine how much of their $10 to send to participants in Room B.
5. Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six to determine the
amount of money available to them.
6. Participants in Room B determine how much to return to participants in Room A.
7. The forms are taken to a recorder who determines payoffs for participants in Room A and
Room B.
8. The decision form is returned to participants in Room A and the computation form is
returned to participants in Room B. Participants in both rooms receive payment for
participation.
9. A post-experiment questionnaire is administered.

2. Instructions for the PAYOFF Treatment
General Instructions
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making experiment. In the experiment, you
will be paired with another participant located in another room. You will not be told the identity
of the other participant at any time during or after the experiment. It is very important that you
not talk or communicate with others throughout the experiment.
One half of the participants are completing the experiment in Room A and the other half in
Room B. Each participant in Room A will be randomly paired with someone in Room B. Each
participant in Room A and Room B is given $10. Participants in Room A have the opportunity
to send any portion of their $10 to a randomly assigned participant in Room B. Participants in
Room A can send any dollar amount – $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, or $10.
Each dollar sent to Room B is increased either three times or six times. Participants in Room
B know whether the amount received is increased three or six times. The likelihood that the
amount increases three times is 50 percent and the likelihood that it increases six times is 50
percent. Over the entirety of the experiment (i.e., over many sessions), the amount sent is
multiplied by three one-half of the time and by six the other half. Participants in Room B decide
how much money to send back to Room A and how much money to keep. Participants in Room
B can send back any dollar amount – ranging from $0 to three- or six-times the amount received
from Room A. After participants in Room B make their decisions, participants in Room A learn
whether the amount that they originally sent to Room B was increased three or six times.
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The remainder of the instructions explains exactly how the experiment is conducted. The
experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters, will know the personal
decisions of participants in Room A or Room B.
Specific Instructions
Participants in each room will draw envelopes from a bag. The envelopes will include a code
number, which you must keep with you. One of the envelopes will be marked ‘Monitor.’ The
Monitor will not be paired with another participant, but rather will verify that the instructions are
followed and assist in conducting the experiment. The Monitor’s envelope will indicate how
s/he is paid at the conclusion of the experiment.
In addition to a code number, the envelopes include different information for participants in
Room A and Room B. For those in Room A, the envelope contains a decision form, which
includes the participant’s code number. The decision form requires participants in Room A to
indicate the amount to send to a randomly paired participant in Room B – this can be any dollar
amount from $0 to $10. For participants in Room B, the envelopes include a computation form,
which includes the participant’s code number, and states whether the amount received increases
three times or six times. Remember, there is a 50 percent chance that the amount received
increases three times and a 50 percent chance that it increases six times.
Participants in Room A complete the decision form and return it to the original envelope.
The monitor collects the envelopes, which are then randomly distributed to participants in Room
B. Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six. Next,
participants in Room B determine how much to send back to the randomly-paired participant in
Room A – the amount sent back can range from $0 to three or six times the amount received.
As mentioned earlier, participants in both rooms receive a form. Each form must be
completely filled out. The decision form received by participants in Room A is shown below.
The first line is filled in. Participants in Room A fill in the second line. Participants in Room B
fill in the third and fourth lines.
Decision Form – Room A
(1) Code Number - Room A:
__________
(2) Amount Sent to Room B:
__________
(3) Code Number - Room B:
_________
(4) Amount Returned to Room A: __________
The computation form received by participants in Room B is shown below. The form is used
to determine the amount of money available to participants in Room B. The first line is filled in.
The second line also is filled in and indicates whether the amount received increases three times
or six times. Participants in Room B fill in the third, fourth, and fifth lines.
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Computation Form – Room B
(1) Code Number - Room B:
__________
(2) Increase in Amount Received: __________
(3) Amount Received:
__________
(4) Amount Available [(2) x (3)]: __________
(5) Amount Kept:
__________
Ultimately, the decision form and the computation form are returned to participants in Room
A. The two forms are used to determine payoffs for participants in the two rooms.
Upon completion in Room B, the forms are returned to the envelope received from Room A,
collected, and taken to a Recorder. The Recorder, who does not have any knowledge of the
participants or the purpose of the experiment, makes a record of participants’ decisions and
calculates the payoffs. Payments for participation are placed in an envelope and returned to
participants by the Monitor. The payments are calculated as follows.
Room A = $10 – amount sent + amount returned
Room B = $10 + (multiplier * amount received) – amount returned
Participants in Room A each receive an envelope that contains their payment along with two
forms: the returned decision form and the computation form, indicating the amount of money
available to participants in Room B. Participants in Room B each receive an envelope that
contains their payment.
In addition to the procedures described above, all participants are paid $5 for completing a
post-experiment questionnaire. The amount you receive in the envelope includes the $5 for the
questionnaire.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Summary of Procedures
Participants in each room randomly draw an envelope.
In Room A, the envelopes contain a code number and a decision form.
In Room B, the envelopes contain a code number and a computation form. The computation
form indicates whether the amount received increases three times or six times.
Participants in Room A determine how much of their $10 to send to participants in Room B.
Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six to determine the
amount of money available to them.
Participants in Room B determine how much to return to participants in Room A.
The forms are taken to a recorder who determines payoffs for participants in Room A and
Room B.
The decision form and computation form are returned to participants in Room A.
Participants in both rooms receive payment for participation.
A post-experiment questionnaire is administered.
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3. Instructions for the IDENTITY Treatment
General Instructions
You have been asked to participate in a decision-making experiment. In the experiment, you
will be paired with another participant located in another room. It is very important that you not
talk or communicate with others throughout the experiment.
One half of the participants are completing the experiment in Room A and the other half in
Room B. Each participant in Room A will be randomly paired with someone in Room B. Each
participant in Room A and Room B is given $10. Participants in Room A have the opportunity
to send any portion of their $10 to a randomly assigned participant in Room B. Participants in
Room A can send any dollar amount – $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, or $10.
Each dollar sent to Room B is increased either three times or six times. Only participants in
Room B know whether the amount received is increased three or six times. The likelihood that
the amount increases three times is 50 percent and the likelihood that it increases six times is 50
percent. Over the entirety of the experiment (i.e., over many sessions), the amount sent is
multiplied by three one-half of the time and by six the other half. Participants in Room B decide
how much money to send back to Room A and how much money to keep. Participants in Room
B can send back any dollar amount – ranging from $0 to three- or six-times the amount received
from Room A.
After participants in Room B decide how much money to send back to participants in Room
A, a six-sided die will be rolled to determine whether participants in Room B send a picture of
themselves to participants in Room A. The die will be rolled for each participant. If the die roll
is odd (1, 3, or 5), the participant’s picture is sent to Room A. If the die roll is even (2, 4, or 6),
the participant’s picture is not sent.
The remainder of the instructions explains exactly how the experiment is conducted. The
experiment is structured so that the experimenters will not know the personal decisions of
participants in Room A or Room B.
Specific Instructions
After the instructions have been read aloud, the experimenter will take a picture of each
participant in Room B using a Polaroid camera. A picture will be placed in front of each
participant in Room B.
Participants in each room will draw envelopes from a bag. The envelopes will include a code
number, which you must keep with you. Participants in Room B will record their code number
plainly on the border of their picture.
One of the envelopes in the bag will be marked ‘Monitor.’ The Monitor will not be paired
with another participant, but rather will verify that the instructions are followed and assist in
conducting the experiment. The Monitor’s envelope will indicate how s/he is paid at the
conclusion of the experiment.
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In addition to a code number, the envelopes include different information for participants in
Room A and Room B. For those in Room A, the envelope contains a decision form, which
includes the participant’s code number. The decision form requires participants in Room A to
indicate the amount to send to a randomly paired participant in Room B – this can be any dollar
amount from $0 to $10. For participants in Room B, the envelopes include a computation form,
which includes the participant’s code number, and states whether the amount received increases
three times or six times. Remember, there is a 50 percent chance that the amount received
increases three times and a 50 percent chance that it increases six times.
Participants in Room A complete the decision form and return it to the original envelope.
The monitor collects the envelopes, which are then randomly distributed to participants in Room
B. Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six. Next,
participants in Room B determine how much to send back to the randomly-paired participant in
Room A – the amount sent back can range from $0 to three or six times the amount received.
As mentioned earlier, participants in both rooms receive a form. Each form must be
completely filled out. The decision form received by participants in Room A is shown below.
The first line is filled in. Participants in Room A fill in the second line. Participants in Room B
fill in the third and fourth lines.
Decision Form – Room A
(1) Code Number - Room A:
__________
(2) Amount Sent to Room B:
__________
(3) Code Number - Room B:
__________
(4) Amount Returned to Room A: __________
The computation form received by participants in Room B is shown below. The form is used
to determine the amount of money available to participants in Room B. The first line is filled in.
The second line also is filled in and indicates whether the amount received increases three times
or six times. Participants in Room B fill in the third, fourth, and fifth lines.
Computation Form – Room B
(1) Code Number - Room B:
__________
(2) Increase in Amount Received: __________
(3) Amount Received:
__________
(4) Amount Available [(2) x (3)]: __________
(5) Amount Kept:
__________
Ultimately, the decision form is returned to participants in Room A and is used to determine
their payoffs. The computation form is only used to determine payoffs for participants in Room
B. The form is returned to participants in Room B and is never seen by participants in Room A.
Upon completion in Room B, the forms are returned to the original envelopes. Then the
experimenter will roll a six-sided die, numbered 1-6, to determine whether a participant’s picture
is sent to Room A. The experimenter will roll the die for each participant in Room B. If an odd
number is rolled (1, 3, or 5) the participant’s picture will be placed in the envelope returned to
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Room A. If an even number is rolled (2, 4, or 6) the picture will remain in front of the
participant in Room B.
After the die has been rolled for everyone, enveloped will be collected and taken to a
Recorder. The Recorder, who does not have any knowledge of the participants or the purpose of
the experiment, makes a record of participants’ decisions and calculates the payoffs. Payments
for participation are placed in an envelope and returned to participants by the Monitor. The
payments are calculated as follows.
Room A = $10 – amount sent + amount returned
Room B = $10 + (multiplier * amount received) – amount returned
Participants in Room A each receive an envelope that contains their payment along with the
returned decision form – now completely filled out – and possibly a picture of the participant
with who they were paired. Participants in Room B each receive an envelope that contains their
payment along with their computation form.
In addition to the procedures described above, all participants are paid $5 for completing a
post-experiment questionnaire. The amount you receive in the envelope includes the $5 for the
questionnaire.
Summary of Procedures
1. Participants in Room B have their picture taken and placed in front of them.
2. Participants in each room randomly draw an envelope.
3. In Room A, the envelopes contain a code number and a decision form.
4. In Room B, the envelopes contain a code number and a computation form. The computation
form indicates whether the amount received increases three times or six times.
5. Participants in Room A determine how much of their $10 to send to participants in Room B.
6. Participants in Room B multiply the amount received by either three or six to determine the
amount of money available to them.
7. Participants in Room B determine how much to return to participants in Room A.
8. A six-sided die is rolled for each participant in Room B to determine whether their picture is
sent to Room A. An odd roll means that the participant’s picture is sent, whereas an even roll
means that the participant’s picture stays in front of them.
9. The forms are taken to a recorder who determines payoffs for participants in Room A and
Room B.
10. The decision form is returned to participants in Room A and possibly a picture of the
participant with whom they were paired. The computation form is returned to participants in
Room B. Participants in both rooms receive payment for participation.
11. A post-experiment questionnaire is administered.
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Figure 1: Trust and Reciprocity for BASE Treatment
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Panel B: Distribution of Reciprocity Ratioa
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a

The amount sent from room A to room B is increased by a multiplier of three or six (M-3x or
M-6x), where the increased amount represents the total available in room B. Subjects in room B
know the multiplier ex ante (at the beginning of the game), whereas those in room A never learn
the multiplier. The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the
total available in room B.
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Frequency

Figure 2: Trust and Reciprocity for PAYOFF Treatment
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Panel A: Distribution of Amount Sent from Room A
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Panel B: Distribution of Reciprocity Ratioa
a

The amount sent from room A to room B is increased by a multiplier of three or six (M-3x or
M-6x), where the increased amount represents the total available in room B. Subjects in room B
know the multiplier ex ante (at the beginning of the game), whereas those in room A learn the
multiplier ex post (at the end of the game). The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount
returned to room A divided by the total available in room B.
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Frequency

Figure 3: Trust and Reciprocity for IDENTITY Treatment
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Panel B: Distribution of Reciprocity Ratioa
a

The amount sent from room A to room B is increased by a multiplier of three or six (M-3x or
M-6x), where the increased amount represents the total available in room B. Subjects in room B
know the multiplier ex ante (at the beginning of the game), whereas those in room A never learn
the multiplier. Subjects in room A, however, may receive a picture of their counterpart in room
B at the end of the game. The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount returned to room A
divided by the total available in room B.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for BASE Treatment
Panel A: Subjects in Room A
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Amount
Sent
6.36
6.50
10.00
3.50
0.00
10.00
44

Return on
Trusta
1.10
1.00
1.00
0.67
0.00
3.00
40

Panel B: Subjects in Room B
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Reciprocity Ratioc
M-3x
M-6x Combinedd
0.30
0.22
0.26
0.33
0.17
0.27
0.33
0.17
0.33
0.17
0.13
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.50
0.67
21
19
40

a

The return on trust is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the amount sent from
room A.
b
Forty-four pairs of subjects participated in the BASE treatment. Four subjects in room A sent
zero to room B. In this case, the return on trust is undefined and those in room B do not have the
opportunity to reciprocate.
c
The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the total available
in room B.
d
The combined column collapses subjects in room B with multipliers of three (M-3x) and six
(M-6x) into one group.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for the PAYOFF Treatment
Panel A: Subjects in Room A
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Amount
Sent
6.00
6.00
10.00
3.05
0.00
10.00
45

Return on
Trusta
1.03
1.00
0.00
0.97
0.00
3.14
42

Panel B: Subjects in Room B
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Reciprocity Ratioc
M-3x
M-6x Combinedd
0.28
0.22
0.25
0.33
0.22
0.24
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.19
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.67
0.52
0.67
22
20
42

a

The return on trust is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the amount sent by
room A.
b
Forty-five pairs of subjects participated in the PAYOFF treatment. Three subjects in room A
sent zero to room B. In this case, the return on trust is undefined and those in room B do not
have the opportunity to reciprocate.
c
The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the total available
in room B.
d
The combined column collapses subjects in room B with multipliers of three (M-3x) and six
(M-6x) into one group.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the IDENTITY Treatment
Panel A: Subjects in Room A
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Amount
Sent
6.48
6.00
10.00
3.02
1.00
10.00
33

Return on
Trusta
1.91
1.67
1.00
1.01
0.00
5.00
33

Panel B: Subjects in Room B
Statistic
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Observationsb

Reciprocity Ratioc
M-3x
M-6x Combinedd
0.45
0.42
0.43
0.50
0.46
0.50
0.67
0.50
0.50
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.67
0.83
0.83
17
16
33

a

The return on trust is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the amount sent by
room A.
b
Thirty-three pairs of subjects participated in the IDENTITY treatment. Three subjects in room
A sent zero to room B. In this case, the return on trust is undefined and those in room B do not
have the opportunity to reciprocate.
c
The reciprocity ratio is defined as the amount returned to room A divided by the total available
in room B.
d
The combined column collapses subjects in room B with multipliers of three (M-3x) and six
(M-6x) into one group.
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